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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
V.
)
TABITHA LEIN MORGAN
)
AKA TRUNNELL,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 47136-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-56246

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tabitha L. Morgan aka Trunnell pied guilty to aggravated battery, and the district court
sentenced her to two years, with one year fixed. The district court also denied her Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 ("Rule 35") motion for leniency. Ms. Trunnell appeals, and she argues that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. She also argues that the district
court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging that Ms. Trunnell committed the crime of
aggravated battery for injuring the current wife of Ms. Trunnell's ex-boyfriend. (R., pp.7-8, 17-
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18; Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"),1 pp.67-68.) According to the PSI, Ms. Trunnell
knocked the woman to the ground, kicked her, and slammed her head into the concrete. (PSI,
pp.67-68.) The woman sustained serious injuries to her eye and under-eye area. (PSI, pp.67-68.)
After a preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause for the offense and bound
Ms. Trunnell over to district court. (R., pp.14, 15-16, 19-20.) Pursuant to a plea agreement with
the State, Ms. Trunnell pled guilty to aggravated battery. (R., pp.35, 48; Tr., p.11, L.4-p.13,
L.11.) The State agreed to recommend probation, with an underlying sentence often years, with
three years fixed. (R., p.48.)
At sentencing, the State made a recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.
(Tr., p.17, Ls.4-8.) Ms. Trunnell requested probation, with an underlying sentence of five years,
with two years fixed. (Tr., p.23, Ls.16-18.) The PSI also recommended probation. (PSI, p.80.)
The district court disagreed with these recommendations and sentenced Ms. Trunnell to two
years, with one year fixed. (Tr., p.33, Ls.18-20.)
Ms. Trunnell timely appealed from the district court's judgment of conviction.
(R., pp.57-59, 61-62.) Ms. Trunnell later filed a Rule 35 motion for leniency and sent a letter to
the district court in support. (R., pp.65, 66-69.) The district court denied her motion. (Aug.
R., pp.1-3.)

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of two years,
with one year fixed, upon Ms. Trunnell for aggravated battery?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. Trunnell's Rule 35 motion?
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Citations to the PSI refer to the 148-page electronic document with the confidential exhibits.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Two Years,
With One Year Fixed, Upon Ms. Trunnell For Aggravated Battery
"It is well-established that ' [w ]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence."' State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Ms. Trunnell's sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See LC. § 18-908 (fifteen years maximum). Accordingly, to show that the sentence
imposed was unreasonable, Ms. Trunnell "must show that the sentence, in light of the governing
criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460
(2002). Similarly, "[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court .... " State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615
(Ct. App. 1990).
"'Reasonableness' of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.

Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. "A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary ob jective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution." State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
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In this case, Ms. Trunnell asserts that the district court abused its discretion by imposing
an excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, she contends that the
district court should have suspended her sentence and placed her on probation in light of the
mitigating factors, including the absence of any criminal record, employment history, family and
friend support, lack of mental health or substance abuse issues, and acceptance of responsibility
and remorse.
First, the absence of any prior convictions or arrests warranted a lesser sentence for
Ms. Trunnell. “The absence of a criminal record is a mitigating factor that courts consider.”
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 836 (2011). “It has long been recognized that ‘[t]he first offender
should be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal.” State v. Hoskins, 131
Idaho 670, 673 (Ct. App. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91
(1982)). Here,

Ms. Trunnell had no past arrests, charges, or convictions.

(PSI, p.70.) She had no disciplinary issues in jail. (PSI, p.70.) According to her trial counsel,
Ms. Trunnell did not even have a speeding ticket. (Tr., p.20, Ls.1–2.) The lack of a criminal
record showed that Ms. Trunnell could succeed on probation. As a first offender, Ms. Trunnell
should have received a more lenient sentence or probation.
Second, Ms. Trunnell’s stable employment prior to the instant offense also showed that
she was an appropriate candidate for probation. Ms. Trunnell worked at Family Dollar as an
assistant manager for over two years and then worked at Wal-Mart as a department manager for
almost two years by the time of the commission of this offense. (PSI, p.75.) Ms. Trunnell’s
co-worker stated that Ms. Trunnell was a hardworking, punctual, dedicated, and self-motivated
employee. (PSI, p.98.) She also wrote that Ms. Trunnell participated in volunteer activities for
Wal-Mart, such as toys of tots and relay for life, and helped other employees on her days off.
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(PSI, p.98.) Ms. Trunnell’s strong employment history supported a lesser sentence of probation.
See State v. Mitchell, 77 Idaho 115, 118 (1955) (recognizing gainful employment as a mitigating
factor); see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594–95 (1982) (employment and desire to
advance within company were mitigating circumstances).
Third, Ms. Trunnell had a supportive family and friends, which also could help her
succeed on probation. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 594–95 (family support and good character as
mitigation); see State v. Ball, 149 Idaho 658, 663–64 (Ct. App. 2010) (district court considered
family and friend support as mitigating circumstance). Here, Ms. Trunnell had a very strong
relationship, and lived with, her mother. (PSI, p.71.) Her mother wrote a letter in support
explaining that Ms. Trunnell was “an amazing mother” and “lived a productive life.” (PSI, p.95.)
Ms. Trunnell has two sons,

, with her current husband, and she had a

son from her relationship with her ex-boyfriend (the victim’s husband). (PSI,
pp.72–73.) Ms. Trunnell was

when she had her child with her ex-boyfriend.

(PSI, pp.72.) Ms. Trunnell was also close with her siblings and grandparents. (PSI, p.71.) In
addition, two friends and a family friend each wrote a letter of support. One friend wrote in part:
She has always maintained a positive outlook on life, even when life gets
hard. She is a great mother. One of the best moms I have ever known. She would
do anything for her kids. She works hard. She has never been unemployed up
until this happened. Tabitha always, ALWAYS does what she has to, to provide
for her children and continue moving on with life. She is a responsible, kind
person.
I’ve personally witnessed Tabitha be kind and compassionate. She has
given money to strangers. She has stood up for people being bullied. One year for
Christmas she bought some Christmas presents for a child she barely knew
because that child wouldn’t have received any presents otherwise. She has always
been there for me when [I] needed her.
My personal opinion of Tabitha’s character is that she is a great person.
She is the type of friend that is loyal, honest, and compassionate.
(PSI, p.96.) A family friend wrote in part:

5

I have known Tabitha for many years. She and one of my daughters are
best friends. She grew up right in my home next to our own children.
As long as I have known Tabitha she has been an amazing human being
with one of the most loving and generous hearts [I] have ever known. She is a
credit to society and a genuine person. I watched as she overcame many
adversities in her fife and turned them into triumphs. She is a smart and hard
working woman who has always provided and done what she thought was right
for her kids. I was concerned when she became a young mother but I saw her turn
into an amazing grown woman after the birth of her first son. She has always
worked and supported her kids and been there for them always. I remember
sending her messages telling her how proud [I] was of the great momma she was.
I meant it too. She was a better mom than many grown women [I] knew. She still
is a great mom.
I have much respect for Tabitha and I have known her to get honest and a
great person. A kind and loving woman, friend, wife and mother.
(PSI, p.97.) Lastly, another friend wrote that she believed Ms. Trunnell was remorseful, and her
actions were “a one time event.” (PSI, p.99.) This friend stated, “I still trust Tabitha with my
children, my home and everything I always have prior to this. She is an amazing mother and
person in general and I know she feels her actions were a mistake, and she’s paying for them.”
(PSI, p.99) Ms. Trunnell’s family and friend support stood in favor of a more lenient sentence of
probation.
Fourth, Ms. Trunnell did not have any serious mental health issues or any issues with
substance abuse. She reported that she drank alcohol occasionally on holidays or special
occasions. (PSI, p.76.) She never used any illicit substances. (PSI, p.76.) She also reported that
her mental health was good, and she had never been diagnosed with any mental health issues.
(PSI, p.76.) Ms. Trunnell’s stable mental health and drug-free lifestyle indicated that she could
successfully comply with probation.
Finally, Ms. Trunnell expressed remorse for the victim’s injury and accepted
responsibility for the crime. Acceptance of responsibility, remorse, and regret are all factors in
favor of mitigation. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). During the presentence
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interview, Ms. Trunnell stated, "I regret every decision I made that night. I should have removed
myself from the situation entirely and not allow my anger to get the best of me." (PSI, p.69.) She
also reported:
I understand that I let my emotions get the best of me and I am deeply
sorry for the victim. I understand my actions are going to have a long term affect
and I'm going to have to live with the fact that I am going to be a felon. I hope the
courts can find it in themselves to see I am a hard working mother who made one
really wrong decision I do not want this to define who I am.
(PSI, p. 78.) Ms. Trunnell made similar remarks at sentencing, stating:

I would like to apologize to the court and to [the victim]. I do have deep remorse
for what happened that night and deep, deep regret for not leaving the situation
when I should have. I do have two young children now that I need to be there for.
Yes, I am remorseful, and I do understand the plan she went through, so I'm
sorry.
(Tr., p.24, Ls.15-22.) These statements of acceptance, remorse, and regret stood in favor of
mitigation.
In summary, Ms. Trunnell submits that the district court failed to exercise reason by not
giving sufficient weight to these mitigating factors. Ms. Trunnell's status as first-time offender,
employment history, family and friend support, stable mental health, drug-free lifestyle, and
acceptance of responsibility and remorse demonstrated that she was an appropriate candidate for
probation. By failing to give adequate weight to these mitigators, the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence of two years, with one year fixed.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Ms. Trunnell's Rule 35 Motion
"A Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court." State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In
reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court must "consider the entire record and
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apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the original sentence.” Id. The
Court “conduct[s] an independent review of the record, having regard for the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v. Burdett,
134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). “Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce
a sentence under Rule 35,” the Court’s scope of review “includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce.” State v.
Araiza, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985). “When presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant
must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently
provided to the district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
203 (2007).
Here, Ms. Trunnell provided new and additional information to support her request for
probation. In a letter to the district court, she expressed her remorse and regret for his actions.
(R., p.67.) She also informed the district court that she was willing to take anger management
and impulse control classes and one-on-one therapy to address the root cause of her violence
towards the victim—the contested custody battle with her ex-boyfriend over their son. (R., p.67;
see also PSI, pp.70, 73, 74.) Ms. Trunnell also wrote that she wanted to “give back to the
community” and work to pay the victim’s medical expenses, which was “very important” to her.
(R., p.68.) She also explained that she wanted to be reunited with her children because “they
deserve better than this.” (R., p.69.) This new and additional information of Ms. Trunnell’s
remorse and regret, willingness to participate in therapy, and her commitment to paying
restitution supported a suspended sentence and probation. Therefore, Ms. Trunnell maintains that
the district court abused its discretion by denying her Rule 35 motion.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Trunnell respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she respectfully requests that this Court vacate her judgment of
conviction and remand her case for a new sentencing hearing. For the denial of her Rule 35
motion, she respectfully requests that this Court reverse or vacate the district court's order
denying her Rule 35 motion and remand this case for further proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of October, 2019.

Isl Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 10th day of October, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Isl Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

JCSleas
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